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INCOME TAX - DEDUCTIONS - LEGAL FEES
AS A MEDICAL EXPENSE*
In the recent case of Gerstacker v. Commissioner1 the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed a decision of the Tax
Court and allowed taxpayers to deduct the legal expenses which
they had incurred in having Mrs. Gerstacker committed to a
mental institution where doctors had advised that such commit-
ment was necessary.
Taxpayers were husband and wife who in filing a joint tax
return deducted the legal fees which they had incurred in secur-
ing the commitment of Mrs. Gerstacker to a mental institution
through guardianship proceedings. All three of "(h)er doctors
advised Mr. Gerstacker that his wife could be treated success-
fully only if she ... could not leave and disrupt her therapy."
Taxpayers argued, therefore, that the legal fees were necessary
medical expenses and deductible under Internal Revenue Code of
1954 (hereinafter Code) § 213(e) (1) (A and B) 3 , but the Tax
Court 4 decided that they were non-deductible personal expenses
under Code section 262,5 saying that the legal services "were not
rendered as a part of a course of 'treatment' for [Mrs. Ger-
stacker's] mental illness. They did not have a direct or proxi-
mate therapeutic effect on her mental disorders."6 In reversing
for the taxpayers, the court of appeals held "that where legal
expenses are necessary to legitimate a method of medical treat-
ment for mental illness. .... ,,7 they are deductible as a medical
* Gerstacker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 414 F.2d 448 (6th Cir.
1969).
1. 414 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1969).
2. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
3. INT. REV. CoE of 1954, § 213 (e) (1) defined "medical care" as:
Amounts paid -
(A) for the diagnosis, cure mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or
function of the body,
(B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care
referred to in subparagraph (A).
4. Carl A. Gerstacker, 49 T.C. 522 (1968).
5. INT. REV. CoE of 1954, § 262 provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduc-
tion shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.
6. 49 T.C. at 527.
7. 414 F.2d at 453.
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expense. The court limited its decision by allowing taxpayers
to deduct only those fees that were the direct cost of the guard-
ianship proceedings.8
I. INMODUCTION
Since the medical expense deduction is an exception to the
general rule of section 262 that no deduction is allowed for per-
sonal expenses, it is subject to the broad rules governing all
similar exceptions to that rule.9 The most familiar rule applica-
ble to deductions is "that an income tax deduction is a matter
of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing the
right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer."10
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the Gerstacker case
and the tests that the court of appeals applied to overrule the
Commissioner and the Tax Court. In Gerstacker the court of
appeals discussed, first, the legislative history test, looking to
the congressional intent behind the passage of the medical deduc-
tion section of the Code and, second, the Tax Court test for
determining whether or not an expense is for "medical care."
After consideration of these two standard tests, the court dis-
cussed two tests -which have recently emerged and are being used
to determine the proximate cause question of the medical neces-
sity of the service creating the expense: the "direct-indirect"
test and the "therapeutic value" test. By analysis of these tests
within the context of the Gerstacker case, this comment will
show the extent to which courts will now go to find the proxi-
mate cause necessary to provide taxpayer's relief within the
limits of section 213.
II. LEGISTATiVE HiFsTOny
The court of appeals in Gerstacker, lke most courts which
have dealt with section 213(1) (e) of the Code," looked to the
legislative history of the statute to determine how inclusively
that section should be interpreted. The leading case on the
weight to be given the legislative history of section 213 (1) (e)
8. Id.
9. See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (c) (1967).
10. Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943),
rehearing denied 320 U.S. 809. See also Oliver v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 575
(8th Cir. 1966); Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(h) (1969); and Note, An Argument
Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should be Narrowly Construed As a
Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1142 (1943).
11. See generally Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499 (1962) ; Carasso v.
Commissioner, 292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961); Ochs v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d
692 (2d Cir. 1952); Commissioner v. Stringham, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950).
1970]
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is Commisioner v. Bilder.12 In that case the Supreme Court
rejected a lengthy argument by the taxpayer asking the Court
to confine its interpretation of the statute to the express lan-
guage on the face of the statute. Taxpayer had persuaded the
court of appeals to allow him to deduct the cost of his meals and
lodging incurred while resting in Florida on doctor's advice. In
doing so, the taxpayer had persuaded the court of appeals to
reject the Commissioner's argument which was based on House
and Senate reports where, in the hypothetical situation there dis-
cussed, a deduction was not allowed. The facts of the hypotheti-
cal were precisely similar to those in Bder. The Bilder Court, in
reversing the court of appeals, said simply that it was relying
"on the congressional purpose explicitly revealed in the House
and Senate Committee Reports .... ,13
By looking at congressional reports proposing the allowance
of a deduction for "extraordinary" medical expenses in 1942 and
those accompanying the 1954 revisions,14 we see the basis which
most courts have used for determining the inclusiveness of the
statute. In the Finance Committee's report in 1942 the reason
for the enactment of a medical deduction section was given:
"This allowance is recommended in consideration of the heavy
tax burden that must be borne by individuals during the existing
emergency and of the desirability of maintaining the present
high level of public health and morale."15 That report continued
by saying:
The term "medical care" is broadly defined to include
amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of
affecting any structure or function of the body. It is
not intended, however, that a deduction should be al-
lowed for any expense that is not incurred primarily for
12. 369 U.S. 499 (1962).
13. Id. at 502.
14. In the 1939 Code a deduction for medical expenses was allowed by
section 24 (a) (1) [replaced by section 262 of 1954 Code] which provided
that "in computing net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in
respect of-(1) personal, living, or family expenses, except extraordinary medi-
cal expenses deductible under section 23 (x) ... ." [Commissioner v. Bilder,
289 F.2d 291, 307 (3rd Cir. 1961).] "Section 23 (x) of the 1939 Code was
added to that Code by section 127 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1942." [Id. at
298.] In the 1954 Code language nearly identical to that of section 23 (x)
was enacted as section 213(e) (1). [Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499, 501
(1962).]
15. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942).
[Vol. 22
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the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental
defect or illness.16
The re-enactment of section 23 (x) of the 1939 Code as section
213 of the 1954 Code contained several liberalizing sections' 7
which were described in the House Committee Reports as neces-
sary for the purpose of allowing "the deduction of 'extraordi-
nary' medical expenses."' 8 Of the many amendments since 1954,19
the 1966 Amendment removing the maximum ceiling on the
amount of deductions allowed was probably the most liberalizing
step taken by Congress. This latest amendment's liberalizing
effect was recognized by the House Conferees when they re-
ported "that the removal of the ceiling on medical deductions,
while generally desirable, may raise problems in connection with
amounts claimed as medical expenses deductions .... ",20 Fol-
lowing this trend toward liberalization and broad interpretation
of what constitutes "extraordinary" medical expenses, the court
in Gerstacker stated "that Congress intended to define 'medical
care' broadly and that the legislation was remedial in nature."21
m . HAVEY AND BnLDim TEsTs
The two main cases consistently relied on to determine whether
or not an expense is deductible under section 213(e) (1) are
Edward A. Havey22 and Commissioner v. Bilder.23 The Havey
case established the basic test for determining what constitutes a
deductible medical expense:
To be deductible as medical expense, there must be a,
direct or proximate relation between the expense and
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease or the expense must have been incurred for
16. Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added); accord, Treas. Reg. § 1-213-1 (e) (1)
(ii).
17. The Committee report states that the amending provision:
allows medical expenses in excess of 3 percent of the adjusted
gross income to be deducted, instead of only those in excess of 5
percent; outlays for drugs and medicine may be included in 'medi-
cal expenses only to the extent they exceed 1 percent of adjusted
gross income; and the maximum limitations are raised from $1,250
to $2,500 per exemption, and the overall limit per return is raised
from $2,500 to $5,000, or in the case of a joint return from $5,000
to $10,000. H. R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. A 60 (1964); 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AUm. NEWS,
4055.
18. Id.
19. CoNF. RFP. No. 682, 111 CONG. Rrc. 17527, 17540 (1965).
20. Id.
21. 414 F2d at 450.
22. 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
23. 369 U.S. 499 (1962).
1970]
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the purpose of affecting some structure or function of
the body.
In determining allowability, many factors must be
considered. Consideration should be accorded the motive
or purpose of the taxpayer, but such factor is not alone
determinative. To accord it conclusive weight would
make nugatory the prohibition against allowing per-
sonal, living, or family expenses. Thus also it is im-
portant to inquire as to the origin of the expense. Was
it incurred at the direction or suggestion of a physician;
did the treatment bear directly on the physical condi-
tion in question; did the treatment bear such a direct
or proximate therapeutic relation to the bodily condi-
tion as to justify a reasonable belief the same would be
efficacious; was the treatment so proximate in time to
the onset or recurrence of the disease or condition as
to make one the true occasion of the other, thus elimi-
nating expense incurred for general, as contrasted with
some specific, physical improvement?24
Bilder is the only time that the United States Supreme Court
has granted certiorari to a medical deduction tax case. As
stated, in this decision the Court reversed a court of appeals
decision and adhered strictly to the legislative history of section
213(1) (e) to determine the congressional intent behind the
statute. It decided that this intent should be controlling when
interpreting the statute. The Commissioner in Ger8tacker cited
Bilder as a limitation on what could be deductible as a medical
expense since the Bilder court refused to allow the taxpayer to
deduct his meals and rent while in Florida for treatment. But
the court of appeals in Gerstaceker read Bilder as not being so
restrictive as to disallow legal fees as a medical deduction.
25 It
appears that the Gerstaceker court refused to read Bilder as
limiting the inclusiveness of a medical expense. This leads to the
conclusion that Bilder should be narrowly construed and that
courts interpreting medical deduction sections should be con-
trolled by congressional intent when specifically set out in the
legislative history.
26
24. 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949), quoted in Gerstacker v. Commissioner, 414 F.2d
448, 450 (6th Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
25. 414 F.2d at 452.
26. Cf. United States v. Ohio, 354 F2d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 1966) ; Newman
& Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 170, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Norris Dis-
pensers, Inc. v. United States, 211 F. Supp. 79, 80 (D. Minn. 1962).
[Vol. 2,
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IV. "DnixCT-IXDunEr" AND "Tim p'rio VA 'UL" TsTs
After discussing the Havey test and the Bilder legislative his-
tory argument, the Gerstaceker court seems to have decided the
issue on how "directly" the expense must relate to the illness
and the "therapeutic value" of the services creating the expense.
Statements by the court lead to the conclusion that the courts may
be taking a liberal turn toward allowing medical deductions.
The court refused the Commissioner's argument of a strict
"direct-indirect" test and said the expenditure "must be proxi-
mately related to taxpayer's medical care"27 to be deductible.
The court also found that "the services of the personal attorney
for Mrs. Gerstacker... had a directly therapeutic value." 28 And
finally, the court took a further liberal step by saying "except
for Mrs. Gerstacker's illness these expenses would not have been
incurred."29
Looking at the medical deduction field generally, there seem
to be two major groupings in which one could categorize the
court's and the Commissioner's decisions dealing with an inter-
pretation of section 213(e) (1) of the Code. They are, first,
the expenses incurred in treating mental illness and, second,
those incurred in treating physical illness. These groups can be
subdivided into several divisions.30 The physical illness category
contains expenditures for capital improvements [i.e., air condi-
tioners, dust elimination systems, elevators, fall-out shelters,
furnaces, iron lung facilities, oxygen equipment, reclining chairs,
and swimming pools]; special foods and diets; and travel and
transportation [i.e., trips to Florida or Bermuda, special auto-
mobiles, and trips to the golf course]. The mental illness cate-
gory contains expenditures for special schools and care [i.e.,
remedial reading class, mental institutions, private schools,
nurseries, military schools, and schools for the blind and the
deaf] and therapeutic activities [i.e., clarinet and dancing les-
sons, use of contraceptives, wigs, and legal aid]. To get a better
understanding of why the court in Gerstaceer took a liberal
stand and to predict the possible effects of this decision, some
conclusions, derived mostly from the cases and rulings in the
mental illness category, will be expressed.
27. 414 F2d 448, 450 (6th Cir. 1969).
28. Id. at 451 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 450.
30. Shames, The Unusual Medical Rxpense: How Taxpayers Succeeded in
Proving Their Case, 24 J. TAxATiO 48 (1966). Shames' divisions have been
utilized, but his examples have been supplemented and updated.
1970]
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The "direct-indirect" test was a euphemism for the language
from the 1942 Senate Report saying that the statute was to apply
only to expense incurred "primaily for the prevention or
alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.""'
This language has also been incorporated into the Treasury
Regulations by the Commissioner.3 2 Although this has been the
most consistently applied test for determining whether or not
an expense is deductible as medical care, the Tax Court in
Gerstacker relied explicitly on Bilder and H. Grant Atkins0 3
for its interpretation.
3 4
As discussed above, Bilder was reversed by the Supreme Court
because of specific legislative history covering the fact question;
the Commissioner in Gerstacker, however, attempted to impute a
strict interpretation to the language of section 213 (e) (1) (A).35
By rejecting this argument, the court seems to have recognized
that the word, "primarily," as used to limit "medical care" in the
legislative history, is broader than the "primarily" used to limit
the deductibility of transportation expenses.
Besides refusing the interpretation of the "direct-indirect"
test of Bilder, Gerstacker also refused to be limited by Atkinson.
There the Tax Court refused to allow taxpayer to deduct the
tuition of a mentally ill child sent to a military school on a doc-
tor's recommendation. The court found that, since the school
did not have a medical staff, the "'availability of medical care'
or of special resources for a handicapped individual was not 'a
principal reason' for [taxpayer's son's] attendance . .. ."6 At
the end of its opinion the Tax Court fortified the Commission-
er's "direct-indirect" test by saying: "The Congress did not see
fit to provide as a condition for a medical expense deduction
the mere prescription by a doctor of some course of procedure
regardless of the condition of the individual, the nature of the
expense, and the primary and direct objectives thereof.1
3 7 Al-
though this was a strong holding for the Commissioner, its
effect should have been mitigated by a post-trial article appeal-
31. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96.
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e) (1) (i).
33. 44 T.C. 39 (1965), acquiesced in 1965-2 Cum. BuLT. 4.
34. 49 T.C. at 525.
35. 414 F.2d at 452.
36. 44 T.C. at 53.
37. Id. at 54.
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ing for compassion for the mentally handicapped by the attorney
for the Internal Revenue Service in Atkinson.P8
The landmark decision for the special school cases and the
"direct-indirect" test was Commissioner v. Stringha3 9 where
the court allowed taxpayer a deduction for his child's lodging
and meals in Arizona as necessary to alleviate her respiratory
disease but refused to allow a deduction for the cost of her
schooling since the school provided no medical treatment per se.
The only other school case to reach the appellate courts was
Ochs v. Commissioner40 where the court upheld the decision of
the Tax Court and disallowed the expense of sending children
to boarding school to separate them from their mother. Such
separation was recommended by a doctor because, as a result of a
cancer operation, the mother suffered from extreme pain when
she had to speak to correct the children. The Gerstacer court
distinguished this case as holding that, if there were an alterna-
tive action which would directly alleviate taxpayer's illness
[such as the mother's leaving], it should be taken and would be
deductible. The only help available to Mrs. Gerstacker was,
however, commitment to a mental institution.41
Although there have been only two appellate court cases
dealing with special schools, the Tax Court for many years set
the requirements which must be completed before a medical
deduction would be allowed: (1) the attendance must be on
doctor's recommendation; (2) the school must offer some special
medical sources or resources which can alleviate a special prob-
lem; and (3) the attendance must be primarily for medical
care.42 But, in C. Fink Fischer43 acquiesced in by the Commis-
sioner in 1969,44 the Tax Court may have opened the door for
the deduction of legal fees in such cases.
38. Muchin, Private Schooling for Emotionally Disturbed Children: Is It a
Medical Expense?, 44 TAxEs 699 (1966).
39. 183 F2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950).
40. 195 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 827 (1952).
41. 414 F.2d at 452.
42. See, e.g., H. G. Atkinson, Jr., 44 T.C. 39 (1965), acquiesced in 1965-2
Cum. BULL. 4; W.B. Counts, 42 T.C. 755 (1964), acquiesced in 1964-2 Cum.
BULL. 4; M. Feinberg, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 777 (1966); Hobart J. Hen-
drick, 35 T.C. 1223 (1961), acquiesced in 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 4; M. J. Lichter-
man, 37 T.C. 586 (1961), acquiesced in 1962-2 Cum. Bum- 5; and I. J. Wein-
berg, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mene. 10 (1969).
43. 50 T.C. 164 (1968), acquiesced in 1969-24 Ctut. BuLr 7.
44. Acquiescence occurred subsequent to all decisions cited in n.42. This
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In granting taxpayer a partial deduction for sending a prob-
lem child to a special school which deals specifically with "slow"
children, the court said:
Whether a service for which an expenditure is made
constitutes medical care will depend upon its therapeutic
nature to the individual, and not upon the title of the
person rendering the service, or whether the expense is
'medical' to all persons, or the general nature of the
institution in which the service is rendered.45
This appears to be a subjective test and would therefore allow
the individual taxpayer a better opportunity to convince a jury
in the Court of Claims or a district court of his special problems
and needs.
The Fink case led a tax critic to note that "to date no taxpayer
has first paid the amount in issue and then contested the IRS'
rejection of a refund claim by filing a refund suit in either the
district court, where a jury trial can be obtained, or in the Court
of Claims. Conceivably, these courts might take a more liberal
approach..." to the individual taxpayer's problems.46
The court's finding in Gerstacker that "the services of the per-
sonal attorney for Mrs. Gerstacker, because of some of the
peculiarities of her emotional disturbance and her confidence in
him as a personal friend, had a distinctly therapeutic value"4r
requires us to look at what is the test of "therapeutic value".
This test is mentioned in the Havey48 case and in the Treasury
Regulations."
In determining whether or not true "therapeutic value" exists,
the decisions have been most insistent on specific recommenda-
tion from a physician with less emphasis on the primary relation
between the defect and the prescribed cure. In the only appellate
45. Id. at 174.
46. Block, Is Climate Improving for Medical Deductions for Special School
Tuition, 32 J. TAXATION 116, 118 (Feb. 1970).
47. 414 F.2d at 451.
48. The Tax Court in stating the basic tests asked: "[D]id the treatment
bear such a direct or proximate therapeutic relation to the bodily conditions
as to justify a reasonable belief the same would be efficacious... ?" 12 T.C.
at 412.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1-213 (1) (e) (1) (ii) provides in part:
Amounts paid for . . . treatments affecting any portion of the
body, including .. . expenses of therapy . . ., are deemed to be
for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body
and are therefore paid for medical care.
[Vol. 22
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court case to date, Adler 'v. Commissioner,5" the court disallowed
deductions for dancing lessons as a cure for varicose veins since
they were not prescribed by a doctor. The Adler court relied on
John J. Thoene5' where the Tax Court similarly would not allow
doctor-recommended dancing lessons. The Thoene court recog-
nized that "[t]he fact that dancing was included in the list of
activities . . ., which the psychiatrist felt would be beneficial,
does not mean the dance lessons can be characterized as medical
care."52 But, the Commissioner went so far in a 1962 ruling as
to allow a taxpayer to deduct the cost of "the doctor prescribed
wig in the belief that it would be essential to her mental
health"58 since taxpayer had lost all her hair as a result of a
disease. In another ruling a taxpayer was allowed to deduct the
cost of a clarinet and lessons on the recommendations of an
orthodonist that it could alleviate a disease of the teeth.54 It
would appear from these decisions that "therapetutic value" is
not a conclusion for the Commissioner or a judge, but it is their
determination of the strength and specificity of the doctor's
recommendations presented by the taxpayer as the motivating
force in his action to incur the medical expense. From this we
can conclude that although the facts in Geretacker and Revenue
Ruling 68-32055 are similar-taxpayer sought to deduct the legal
costs of having his son committed to a state institution for treat-
ment-the Ruling will probably stand against the taxpayer on
the theory that there was no evidence in the Ruling that the tax-
payer's action was taken on a doctor's advice.
V. CoNcLUsION
From the decisions and conclusions presented, it can be de-
duced that, in approaching problems dealing with expenses
incurred in alleviating or mitigating a mental illness which is
almost always vague as to noticeability and extent, "the practi-
tioner's biggest problem is to get a court to understand that an
emotional or mental 'disease' is as serious as a respiratory di-
sease .... ,156 This comment has also attempted to show that the
requirements of proximate cause-at least in the mental illness
area-have become more liberal in the taxpayer's favor. Some
50. 330 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1964).
51. 33 T.C. 62 (1959).
52. Id. at 65.
53. Rev. Rul. 62-189, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL. 88.
54. Rev. Rul. 62-210, 1962-2 CuM. BULL 89.
55. Rev. Rul. 68-320, 1968-1 Cum. BuL.. 93.
56. Supra note 38 at 701.
1970]
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more suggestions to the tax lawyer in approaching difficult
problems include "[p]roper testimony couched in the medical
terminology of the Code . ... [and] enlightened and detailed
testimony from physicians .... ,,57 The tax lawyer might also
well argue that "medical deductions stand apart from enter-
tainment, travel, and other business expenses, and a more liberal
attitude favoring their deductibility might be warranted."5 8
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals in Ochs made the most
appropriate statement concerning how problems dealing with the
medical deduction section of the Code should be presented when
it said: "Line drawing may be difficult here as elsewhere, but
that is what courts are for.... ."59 That court went on to say that
"courts of justice ought not to be puzzled by such old scholastic
questions as to where a horse's tail begins and where it ceases.
You are obliged to say, there is a horse's tail at some time."60
DoNALD A. llAnRnR
57. Id. at 703.
58. Id.
59. 195 F.2d at 698.
60. Id., citing Lavery v. Purssell, 39 Ch. D. 508, 517 (1888).
(V  2
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